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IMPROVING THE ACQUISITION PROCESS-
THE ROLE OF CONGRESS 
Colleen A. Preston 
Counsel for Procurement Policy 
U.S. House Armed Services Committee 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been said innumerable times over the past three years that Congress is 
micromanaging the acquisition process -- from its examination of particular 
im;,grams to the adoption of detailed legislative provisions regulating the process 
the Department of Defense uses to acquire its goods and services and the way in 
which the defense industry fulfills its contJ"acts.. The purpose of this paper is to: 
(1) analyze the role that Congress has played through adoption of the Competition 
in Contracting Act of 1984, the Defense Procurement Reform Act of 1984, the 
Small Business and Federal Competition Enhancement Act of 1984, and the 
Defense Procurement Improvement Act of 1985, in terms of the policy Congress 
desired to effectuate, whether the legislation passed did in fact promote that 
policy, and problems encountered in implementing the legislation; (2) determine as 
a result of this analysis what the appropriate role of Congress should be; (3) 
identify minimum changes to enhance the legislation already adopted; and (4) 
provide a recommended blueprint for future action. 
Due to the detail with which one must address the legislation in order to 
provide a basis for determining the impact of Congressional action on the 
acquisition process, this paper will only briefly synopsize the legislation being 
addressed, providing a sufficient amount information to give the reader an 
appreciation of the intent and policy behind the leffislative changes. The policy 
issues considered when enacting the legislation will not be addressed except to the 
extent necessary to highlight a problem with implementation or to elucid.qte the 
rationale behind proposed recorn rnendations. 
During the process of gathering the information necessary to draft this paper, 
I relied on articles, analyses, testimony, reports and sta tern en ts made by mtrny 
experts directly involved in the acquisition process. To those who have contributed 
to the formulation of ideas expressed herein through their willingness to speak out 
on the issue, I express my sincere gratitude. 
The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and should not ~)e 
attributed to any other person or organization. 
THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT 
· The Department of Defense is by fa.r the largest and most complex 
organization in the world, employing more thant 3 million people, operating over 
5,600 installations around the world and executing over 15 million contracts per 
year with some 300,000 contractors.· It is not unusual then that such Rn 
organization would encounter problems of the kind frequently recounted in rnedia 
"horror stories" about $436 hammers and $700 toilet seats. ·what is perlrnps 
unusual, however, is the public's lack of confidence in the Defense Department as n 
result of the focus on a small number of problem Acquisitions. It lias been said tlutt 
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the sheer size and complexity of the military establishment focus medui attention 
on the most minute, easily grasped issues in the hope that understanding the 
process of buying a bolt will yield an understanding of the effectiveness of the 
process as ·a whole. 
There is no question that buying hammers is something the average "man on 
the street" understands. The comment of an Iowa woman que.ried about the spare 
parts issue by a newspaper reporter is perhaps indicative, as she answered: 
-9 
"People here are told they can't get federal funds to clear up nooding 
problems and keep their basements dry and then they go home and 
read that the Pentagon is paying $6,000 for coffee pots. You don't 
have to he too bright to put the two together. We wouldn't be upset 
if they were paying 60 cents for a 30-cent bolt. But let's keep the 
corruption within limits." 
There are also those who recite the horror stories not because ttiey are 
incensed about that particular situation, but because they see the issue as a way to 
discredit the efforts to achieve a defense buildup or to discredit those who voted to 
increl}.se the defense budget. As William F. Buckley, Jr. aptly stated: ''There are 
·people about who hate an expensive Navy not because they mind expensive 
hammers, but because they mind the Navy." 
Finally, Congress believes that it must act to ensure that such horror stories 
do not occur because it is the body that holds the ultimate power of the pur5e, and 
with that power the responsibility to ensure that mon·ey granted any government 
agency is wisely spent. As one member so appropriately stated: 
"The drumbeat of new stories nbout $600 ashtrays and ~700 toilet 
seats is symptomatic of an utter failure of the Defense Department 
to exercise proper oversight of Pentagon procurement contracts and 
the failure of all of us in the J-Iouse to perform our oversight 
responsibility." (Armed Forces Jourr~rnl, August 1985, p.4~.) 
Regardless of the motivation behind bringing these problems to the :1ttf'ntion 
of the r>ublic, the result lias been a conclusion by many that defense contr·1ctin_:: 
officials are too stupid or untrustworthy to do their job; contractors are 1.•roo'.:s. 
racketeers or spies; and that even the watchdogs must be \\'Rtched. Ttiese 
conclusions have in turn cultivated in the Deoartment of Defense an environment 
in which few will take risks or exercise judgm.ent for fear of being the next person 
to be hung at the mast for paying too much for a stool cap. One can question t!1is 
attitude if you assume that as long as there is a legitimate rationale for whnt one 
did there should be no fear of explaining that decision later. The problem is th:l. t 
for any decision in which one would exercise judgment there is a great likelihood 
that another person examining the same circumstances could arrive at a different 
concl11sion. To avoid that result, there is an incentive to remove any sembltmce of 
decisionmaking and instead strictly Rdhere to rigid regulatory guidance re~~roless 
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of the wisdom of such an action -- for if a purcha~e was made in accordance with 
the regulations, one cannot be criticized personally if the result is not perfect -- it 
is a problem with the regulations. That attitude is exactly what Congress was 
trying to prevent with much of its legislation -- the blind adherence to regulation 
and established procedures rather than the exercise of a Ii ttle common sense. 
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